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Comments

THE POWER OF THE TRUSTEE IN PENNSYLVANIA
TO DEVIATE FROM INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In 1824 the Pennsylvania legislature responded to the question
of what investments a trustee could make by promulgating a list
of several legal investments for fiduciaries.1 This field of "legals"
for Pennsylvania trustees has been greatly enlarged through the
years by subsequent legislative enactments,2 most recently the
Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 and its amendments. 3
Consistently these statutes have recognized that the field of
investment is primarily determined by the instructions of the
settlor, as found in the trust instrument.4 For example the 1949
Act provides,
Subject only to the provisions of the trust instrument, if
any, a fiduciary may accept, hold, invest in, and retain,
any of the investments authorized by this act .... 5
As this language makes clear, the investment provisions of a
trust instrument have controlling status over the statutory list of
1. Act of February 18, 1824, No. 24, § 18 (1824) Pa. Laws 25 (repealed
1917) provided that after a trustee petitioned an orphans' court, the court
"may direct an investment in the debt of the United States, of Pennsylvania,
of the City of Philadelphia, or in real securities. .. ."
2. See Stewart, Legal Investments and the Prudent Man in Pennsylvania: A Study of Evolving Concepts, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 121, 124-37 (1964)
which traces the broadening definition of legal investments in Pennsylvania
statutory law from 1824 to 1961.
3.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 7301-19 (1972).

4.
5.

Stewart, supra note 2, at 144.
PA. STAT. AN. tit. 20, § 7302(a) (1972).
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legal investments. The predictable result is that many trustees,
seeking to take advantage of the relatively broad field of statutory
"legals" in recent years, have attempted to deviate from the terms
of their instruments in the area of investments. The purpose of
this Comment is to examine the two types of cases or situations in
which deviation may be sought.
"Interpretation cases" are those in which a court must interpret the language of a trust instrument regarding the investment
powers of the trustee. Strictly speaking, these cases do not involve deviation from the terms of the instrument, but simply interpretation of the terms. However, the effect of the court's decision may be much the same as if deviation from the terms were
approved, since the trustee is generally seeking an interpretation
which will broaden his investment powers beyond the previously
understood limits of the instrument.
"Modification cases" involve those situations in which the investment powers of the trustee are clearly defined in the trust instrument, but some modification in the terms of the instrument is
requested. These cases definitely involve deviation from the provisions of the trust instrument.
Although the cases fall into two distinct classifications, important similarities exist between the two types. Obviously both
types arise from similar factual situations. In fact, both possibilities are frequently raised in the same case, as where a trustee
seeks a certain interpretation of an investment provision and, failing that, requests a modification by the court of the trust instrument. 6 Another similarity is that the same section of statutory
law governs both types of cases.7 Also the decision in both interpretation and modification cases is influenced by many of the
same factors.
Prior to 1949, little deviation from the terms of a trust instrument was permissible. In interpretation cases, courts held
that a trustee must follow an instrument's express directions to
invest in certain specified securities.'
Investments other than
6. See, e.g., Stewart Memorial Fund, 13 Adams L.J. 128 (Pa. C.P.
1971), in which the court interpreted one term of the investment provision
and then went on to authorize deviation from another term; Finley Estate,
48 Pa. D. & C.2d 661 (O.C. Allegheny 1970), wherein the court interpreted
one term of the instrument's investment clause in a restrictive manner and
refused modification of any terms; Close Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 136 (O.C.
Phila. 1952), in which the court acknowledged the possibility of deviation

from the terms of the instrument, but was "unwilling to exercise such
extraordinary power." However, it achieved the same result by approving
the broad interpretation of investment powers favored by the trustee.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7319(a)-(b) (1972).
8. See Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 471, 21 A.2d 59, 61 (1941); Nola's
Estate, 333 Pa. 106, 111, 3 A.2d 326, 328 (1939).

those specifically permitted by the instrument were not approved
by courts. 9 Every statute from 1824 through 1917 which defines
"legals" also "expressly provided that nothing therein contained
should authorize investments 'contrary to the directions' of the
trust instrument."' 10 This generally restrictive interpretation of
language in trust instruments was paralleled in modification cases
by judicial reluctance to authorize deviation from an instrument's
terms, except in the case of charitable trusts."
The Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949, which replaced the
Fiduciaries Act of 1917, contained an important change in regard
to the interpretation cases. In addition to significantly enlarging
the field of legal investments, the Act states in section 18: "In the
absence, however, of an express restriction to the contrary in the
trust instrument, the fiduciary may invest in any investment authorized by this act.' 1 2 In 1967 additional language was grafted on
to the section which now continues as follows:
(b) Exception, Failure of Purpose. Where the instrument establishing a trust contains a restriction on the fiduciary's power of investment, the court having jurisdiction
in its discretion, may release the fiduciary from the investment restriction to the extent and subject to such con9. See Home's Estate, 45 Pitts. 443 (Pa. O.C. 1898).
10. Middleton Estate (No. 2), 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 133 (O.C. Bucks 1955).
11. See Middleton Estate, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 162 (O.C. Bucks 1954).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7319 (a) (1972) provides:
The testator or settlor in the instrument establising a trust may
prescribe the powers, duties and liabilities of the fiduciary regarding the investment or non-investment of principle and income and
the acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of any property which, at
any time or by reason of any circumstance, shall come into his
control, and whenever any such provision shall conflict with this
act, such provision shall control notwithstanding this act. In the
absence, however, of an express restriction to the contrary in the
trust instrument, the fiduciary may invest in any investment
authorized by this act.
The comment on this section by the Joint State Government Commission
was:
There is no statutory precedent for this section. However, it is
declaratory of existing case law. The last sentence is intended to
make it possible for the fiduciary to invest in investments authorized by this act, even though the instrument indicates that other
investments shall be made. Commission's Comment to PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 821.18 (1950).
Calling this section "declaratory of existing case law" does not seem entirely accurate, however. The court in Wayne Trust, 4 Fiduc. Rep. 100, 104
(O.C. Phila. 1954) pointed out that the 1949 statute provided that a
trustee's authority to invest in "legals" could only be overcome by an
express restriction in the instrument, while under the 1917 statute an
implied restriction had been sufficient to prohibit legal investments. This
significant difference in the statutory law was certainly reflected in case
law, as is indicated by the reaction of most orphans' courts through the

early 1950's to the new statute. In 1955 the court in Middleton Estate (No.

2), 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 133, 143 (O.C. Bucks 1955), surveyed the recent past,
and basing its conclusion on six recent cases, stated:
We conclude that the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 has effected a change in the prior law so that the test for the property
of investments in non-specified "legals" is no longer the presence
or absence of directions of the settlor, but rather whether or not
he has set forth restrictions expressly relating to legals.
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ditions, if any, as the court may deem appropriate, if after
hearing it is satisfied that the original purpose of the testator or the settlor cannot be carried out, or is impractical
of fulfillment, and that the authorized release will more
nearly approximate the intention of the testator or settlor.13

The result of these two statutory changes has been an increasing
demand by trustees for greater deviation from the investment provisions of their settlors, either through less restrictive judicial interpretations of instruments or through court-approved modification of investment language.
The following hypothetical situation is typical of many cases
in which a judicial determination is sought as to what investment
powers an instrument has granted a trustee. Reference to this
hypothetical situation will lend continuity and concreteness to this
examination of recent developments in Pennsylvania fiduciary
law. In 1945 a settlor died, leaving a 1944 will which placed his
residuary estate in trust for his widow and two children, with the
remainder interests to go to any grandchildren surviving at the
time of the death of the testator's last surviving child. The pertinent clause of the testator's will reads:
My Trustee may invest at his discretion in bonds of the
United States, bonds of the State of Pennsylvania, and in
secure first mortgages on real estate in the City of Carlisle; under no circumstances, however, shall he invest in
stock of any corporation.
The trustee in 1971 bought shares of stock in three corporations
and sustained a loss when these were sold in 1972. He objects to
being surcharged for the loss.
II. INTERPRETATION CASES
In current interpretation cases the dominant element is often
said to be the intention of the settlor.
No rule regarding wills is more settled than the great General Rule that the testator's intent, if it is not unlawful,
must prevail. This is the reason why so many cases
continually proclaim that the pole star in the construction
of every will is the testator's intent ....

14

Although the instrument must be interpreted to effectuate the
settlor's intentions, in most cases where a judicial interpretation is
sought the problem is not so simple and a further question arises.
Is the language of the instrument sufficiently clear--or sufficiently definite-or sufficiently inclusive-to make it really possi13.
14.

PA. STAT. ANN tit. 20. § 7319(b) (1972).
In re Estate of Kelsey, 393 Pa. 513, 517, 143 A.2d 42, 44 (1958).

ble to ascertain the settlor's intent regarding a potential investment?
Relying on the language of section 18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949, most Pennsylvania courts of the last two decades
have favored broad, non-restrictive interpretations. 15 However,
this general trend was interrupted, and to some extent arrested, by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which demonstrated a more
restrictive attitude by adopting narrow interpretations in three
7
1958 cases 16 and in one 1962 case.'
Most interpretation cases fall readily into two categories. The
first subdivision consists of enumeration cases, those in which the
instrument enumerates one or a series of investments which the
trustee may make. Cases in the second category may be called
prohibition cases, since the trust instruments in these cases expressly prohibit certain investments by the trustee.'
A. Enumeration Cases
A look at the hypothetical presented earlier indicates that the
language of the first part of its investment clause establishes it as
an enumeration case. The language "My Trustee may invest at
his discretion in bonds of the United States, bonds of the State of
Pennsylvania and in secure first mortgages on real estate in the
City of Carlisle . . ." is an enumeration by the testator of certain
investments he authorizes. From the passage of the Fiduciaries
Investment Act of 1949 through 1957, Pennsylvania orphans' courts
consistently held that in enumeration cases a trustee was free to
invest in any legal investments, whether mentioned in the instrument or not. Despite wide variance in language from instrument
to instrument, there was an unbroken string of decisions interpreting investment provisions broadly and, in effect, permitting
trustees to deviate from the previously understood limits of their
investment authority. These lower court decisions were based
primarily on judicial reasoning that the language of the 1949 statute, which requires an "express restriction" in the instrument on
investments which were otherwise legal, 19 was not satisfied by a
mere enumeration of certain investments.
15. See Stewart, supra note 2, 150-63, which traces the cases through
1963; Henry Trust, 13 Fiduc. Rep. 515 (O.C. Del. 1963), aff'd. sub. nom,
In re Estate of Henry, 413 Pa. 478, 198 A.2d 585 (1964); Tower Estate (No.
2), 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 321 (O.C. Phila. 1964), affd. sub. nom, In re Estate of
Tower, 410 Pa. 389, 189 A.2d 870 (1964); Knox Trust (No. 2), 14 Fiduc.
Rep. 599 (O.C. Montg. 1964); Clyde Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 219 (O.C.
Phila. 1963).
16. In re Estate of Saunders, 393 Pa. 527, 143 A.2d 367 (1958); In re
Estate of Jeffries, 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958); In re Estate of Kelsey,
393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 367 (1958).
17. In re Estate of Brown, 408 Pa. 214, 183 A.2d 307 (1962).

18. See Stewart, supra, note 2, at 150, 152, in which these two classifi-

cations are suggested.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7319 (a) (1972).
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In Rouse Estate,20 the remaindermen challenged the trustee's
purchase of several legal investments. Testator's will stated "I authorize and empower my said Executors and Trustees ... " to
make a number of specified investments, but made no mention of
the investments under challenge. Judge Klein of the Philadelphia Orphans' Court noted that since the trust had terminated in
1949 the new statute did not apply, but he still held that the will's
language simply enlarged the trustee's power to make legal investments. He pointed out that the Act of 1949 would remove all fu21
ture doubt in such situations.
Drexel Trust2= was the first case to which the statutory language of section 18 was actually applied. The trust instrument
granted the following investment powers to the trustees:
3. They shall have the right to invest and reinvest the
funds which may at any time come into their hands, in
first class railroad mortgage bonds, of Companies whose
railroads are finished, and earning interest on their entire
bonded debt, and also in State, Municipal or Corporation
bonds, whether of a public or private character, in real
estate yielding an income and in such securities as are considered lawful and valid investments for Trustees in the
State of Pennsylvania .... 23
The trustees had purchased two types of preferred stock, including
one stock in a railroad. Judge Hunter of the Philadelphia Orphans' Court held that although both stocks were legal investments, the railroad stock could not be approved since the testator
had established the standard, which did not include preferred
stock, for railroad investments. However, the other preferred
stock was a proper investment, although the testator had not
specified it, since section 18 of the Act of 1949 provided that any
legal investment was proper if the instrument contained no "ex20. 1 Fiduc. Rep. 514 (O.C. Phila. 1951). The investment clause of
the will provides:
SEVENTH: I order and direct that no change shall be made in any
of my investments unless the same shall become absolutely neces-

sary, in which event, and when necessary to make or renew investments, I authorize and empower my said Executors and Trustees,
without responsibility on their part, to change such investments and
to invest in bonds secured by first mortgages upon real estate in
the City of Philadelphia, bonds of the United States, State of
Pennsylvania and of the City of Philadephia, or in first class railroad (both steam and electric) bonds, or preferred or common
stock of railroad companies (both steam and electric), or in pre-

ferred stock of locomotive works on passenger or freight car works
or gas or electric companies, and in all said investments or changes

thereof, long term investments are to be preferred.
21. Id. at 516.
22. 1 Fiduc. Rep. 530 (O.C. Phila. 1949).
23. Id. at 531-32.

press restriction" on it.24 In its decision the court noted the Comment of the Joint State Government Commission on the statutory
language of section 18:
The last sentence is intended to make it possible for the
fiduciary to invest in investments authorized by this Act,
even though the trust instrument
indicates that other in25
vestments shall be made.
Smith Trust 26 dealt with an instrument providing the following investment authorization:
The power generally to make investments and reinvestments, and to alter, vary and change investments and reinvestments without being confined to those classes of securities which may be designated by law as legal investments for trustees, except that the trustees shall confine their investments and 2reinvestments
to bonds or
7
equivalent classes of securities.
The purchase by the trustees of fifty shares of General Motors
common stock raised the question of what investments the trustee
might properly make. The court conceded that the language was
ambiguous, but agreed with the auditing judge's conclusion that a
trustee's right to invest in any "legals" should not be denied "except in cases in which the trust instrument contains an express
prohibition in the clearest language. ' 28 Here other sections of the
trust instrument gave the trustees broad discretionary powers,
which indicated to the court that a restriction on investment powers was "completely alien to the settlor's thinking;" therefore all
29
legal investments were within the trustees' power.
The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia in Close Estate adopted
the opinion of the auditing judge, Judge Hunter, that a trustee's legal investment in three common stocks was proper despite other
instructions in the trust instrument. The will provided that the
trustees
shall invest and reinvest the funds which may at any time
come into their hands in well secured first Mortgages secured on real estate in the City of Philadelphia or in well
secured Ground Rents issuing out of Real Estate in said
City or in Two story brick houses clear of incumbrance in
good localities in said City or in Bonds of the United States,
State of Pennsylvania or the City of Philadelphia.-'
The Act of 1949 provided relief from an "unnecessarily restricted" interpretation of the investment powers in the instrument, with the language in section 18 of the statute acting as a
"rule of construction which states the presumed intent of the testa24. Id. at 537.
25.

Commission's Comment to PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 20, § 821.18 (1950).

See note 12 supra.
26. 2 Fiduc. Rep. 393 (O.C. Phila. 1952).
27. Id. at 394.
28. Id. at 398.
29. Id. at 399-400.
30. 83 D. & C. 136 (O.C. Phila. 1952).
31. Id. at 145-46.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

tor settlor." 32 In other words, provided there is no "express restriction" in the instrument, it will be presumed that the settlor
had no intention to limit his trustee beyond "legals." Since the
will in this case enumerated several investments, but did not
contain an express restriction on any, the court held that it "is to
be construed as expressing testator's preference for the investments he enumerates, and not as forbidding other legal invest33
ments."
Four later cases in 1953 relied heavily on Close Estate. In
Brown Estate34 the will provided rather precise specifications for
the investments to be made.3 5 The Orphans' Court of Delaware
County found that the investments objected to, although legal under the Act of 1949, clearly failed to meet the "express requirements of the will." Nevertheless, relying on the authority of Close
Estate as the only Pennsylvania case directly in point,
this court holds that the testator by stipulating in his will
the classification of securities for investment by the trustee merely indicated his preference and did not expressly
preclude the trustee from investing in other legal securities. 6
Smith Trust, 7 another enumeration case, involved a will with
an investment clause providing that the trustees "shall invest the
[trust fund] in funded debts of the United States, of the State of
Pennsylvania, and the City of Philadelphia." The Orphans' Court
of Philadelphia County quoted section 18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 and concluded:
It is held that the enumeration of the investment powers
of the trustees in the decedent's will is not "an express restriction," and therefore the trustees may make any investment authorized by the Act of 1949.38
In Frazier Trust,3 9 decided a day later, the same court found
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 148.
34. 85 Pa. D. & C. 452 (O.C. Del. 1953).
35. Id. at 454. The investment clause bequeaths real estate:
To retain existing investments or to sell the same and make reinvestments as hereinafter provided; to invest and reinvest in mortgages which are a first lien on real estate in Pennsylvania and
New York, in the first mortgage bonds of dividend paying railroads,
in car trust or equipment trust certificates of dividend paying
railroads, in United States loans, in loans of the State of Pennsylvania and the State of New York, in loans of municipalities . . .
and similar public divisions in the State of Pennsylvania, and in
ground rents in the City of Philadelphia.
36. Id. at 458-59. The court also noted that English courts, facing
similar statutes, had held that enumeration of certain investments did not
expressly prohibit others.
37. 3 Fiduc. Rep. 401 (O.C. Phila. 1953).
38. Id. at 402.
39. 3 Fiduc. Rep. 399 (O.C. Phila. 1953).

that a provision "to invest and reinvest" in bonds of the United
States, Pennsylvania, or any city, county or township within the
state was not an express restriction on other "legals" within the
statutory meaning. Close Estate, Brown Estate, Rouse Estate,
and the just-adjudicated Smith Trust were cited in support.40
Myers Estate4 1 was another 1953 case relying on Close Estate's
holding that an enumeration of investments did not impose an express restriction on "legals." The instrument provided that the
trustee "shall promptly reinvest . . . in tax-free covenant securities of the character composing the present fund . . ."; the Orphans' Court of York County found that this did not amount to
42
an express restriction on other legal investments.
Wayne Trust,43 decided in 1954, involved somewhat different
testamentary language.
I empower my said executrix and trustee to change any
and all investments from time to time, and to reinvest at
her discretion, confining, however, such investments
and
44
reinvestments to good real estate securities.
The Philadelphia Orphans' Court, however, again had little difficulty in approving investment in non-specified "legals." A will's
provision must be mandatory and not merely permissive, Judge
Lefever held, to supersede statutory investment power; here use
of the word "empower" made the language merely permissive. The
court distinguished section 18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of
1949 from earlier legislation, finding that the 1949 statute required
an express restriction in the instrument in order to narrow the
trustee's legal investment powers whereas previous laws had only
required an implied restriction. In this case the 1917 statute applied since the disputed investments had been made in 1945 and
1947. However, the court refused to construe the will's language
as containing even an implied restriction and therefore approved
all legal investments. The court noted that such an interpretation followed the general trend of Orphans' Court decisions under
45
the Act of 1949.
In Neafie Estate,46 the testator used language which "directs"
and "orders and directs" the trustee to make certain investments.
Other legal investments the trustee had made were approved by
the court, which did not believe that the settlor's direction was sufficient to distinguish the case from earlier decisions that enumeration of investments did not exclude other "legals."
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 400.
85 Pa. D. & C. 425 (O.C. York 1953).
Id. at 426-29.
4 Fiduc. Rep. 100 (O.C. Phila. 1954).
Id. at 102. The language here is quite different from that in the

several enumeration cases previously examined. This still seems like the
proper category for the case, however, since the instrument does specify
a certain investment (one investment, instead of the usual series) and does
not expressly prohibit any investment.
45. Id. at 102-05.
46. 5 Fiduc. Rep. 291 (O.C. Phila. 1955).
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A direction to invest in certain enumerated investments is
not equivalent to an express restriction from investing in
legal investments authorized by the Investment Act.
When a testator authorizes, or empowers, or directs his
trustee to invest in certain enumerated investments, he
does not thereby deprive the trustee of the statutory power of investment conferred by the statute, but rather adds
to such authorized investments
those specifically enumer47
ated in the trust instrument.
This reasoning was amplified in Middleton Estate (No. 2).4 8
in which the Bucks County Orphans' Court probably went further
than in any other Pennsylvania enumeration case in using the language of section 18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 to
justify broad, non-restrictive interpretations of investment clauses.
The language of the will provided:
And further in Trust within the space of two years from
the time of my death to convert into cash such of my estate as shall not consist of such securities as are hereinafter
mentioned and to invest the money so realized at their discretion in the following securities, viz . . . [enumerating
bonds of the State of Pennsylvania and of the United
States, and bonds and mortgages secured on geographically limited real estate in central Philadelphia and subject
to additional restrictions thereon]. In case any investment
of my estate shall be paid off then my said
40 Trustees shall
reinvest in such securities as I have named.
The trustees bought and resold at a loss five shares of common
stock, in order to test their power to invest in "legals."
The court distinguished this case from previous ones where the
instrument merely gave permissive authorization for certain investments or granted some limited power to invest in "non-legals";
instead, the question here was what investments were proper when
certain ones were directed rather than just authorized. The mandatory language of the instrument should properly be viewed as an
implied restriction on nonspecified investments, the court said,
except that the Act of 1949 had established the policy that "restrictive provisions of the trust instrument are of no effect on the
law-given power of a fiduciary to invest in 'legals' unless they expressly go to that question."'' 0 Six Orphans' Court cases51 which
were in point all held that
47. Id. at 296-97.
48. 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 133 (O.C. Bucks 1955).
49. Id. at 134-35.

50. Id. at 143.
51. Id. at 139-43. See Neafie Estate, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 291 (O.C. Phila.
1955); Myers Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 425 (O.C York 1953); Frazier Trust,
3 Fiduc. Rep. 399 (O.C. Phila. 1953); Smith Trust, 3 Fiduc. Rep. 401 (O.C.

Phila. 1953); Brown Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 425 (O.C. Del. 1953); Close
Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 136 (O.C. Phila. 1952).

even a mandatory direction in the trust instrument to invest in specified securities does not amount to an express
restriction against the
purchase of "legals" not embraced
52
within such direction.
The Middleton (No. 2) court, agreeing with these decisions, continued:
We conclude that the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949
has effected a change in the prior law so that the test for
the propriety of investments in non-specified "legals" is no
longer the presence or absence of directions of the settlor,
but rather whether or not he has set forth restrictions expressly relating to "legals." It follows, that the trust instrument must definitely and unequivocally negative
other investments before those specified therein be construed to be exclusive.5
With this comprehensive opinion, it seemed that the law regarding enumeration cases had become relatively well settled. Orphans' court decisions had been unanimous that an enumeration of
investments, even when couched in mandatory language, was not
enough to limit a trustee's power to make any legal investments.
Not only had the orphans' courts implemented the policy of section
18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949, but in some instances
they had welcomed it enthusiastically.64 The 1956 case of Telling Trust55 seemed to indicate the impressive degree of judicial
certainty in regard to enumeration cases. The Philadelphia Orphans' Court did not find it necessary in this case to do more than
briefly note that a deed of trust which authorized several investments contained no express restriction within the meaning of section 18, in holding that other legal investments were also proper.
This certainty was curtailed, however, in 1958 when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided In re Estate of Saunders.56
In the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, Saunders Estate5 7 had been
held to follow the pattern of previous cases in which instructions
to make specified investments did not preclude investment in
other "legals." On appeal to the supreme court, the decision was
reversed, as Justice Bell ruled that the enumeration of invest52. Middleton Estate (No. 2), 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 133, 139 (O.C. Bucks
1955).
53. Id. at 143.
54. See, e.g., Brown Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 452, 459 (O.C. Del. 1953),
in which the court states:
This court approves of the legislative policy as expressed by the
Commission. It is manifestly unwise to bind a trustee in an investment strait-jacket fashioned by a settlor or testator who could
not possibly have foreseen the economic exigencies of the present
fast-moving world ... the decision of the Legislature as to the
propriety of trust investments should not be disregarded by the
courts in the absence of a clearly expressed restriction to the contrary in the trust instrument.
55. 7 Fiduc. Rep. 103 (O.C. Phila. 1956).
56. 393 Pa. 527, 143 A.2d 367 (1958).
57. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 773 (O.C. Phila. 1957), rev'd. sub. nom, In re
Estate of Saunders, 393 Pa. 527, 143 A.2d 367 (1958).
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ments by the testatrix did amount to an express restriction."' Emphasis was added to the decision by the supreme court's similar
restrictive interpretations of the investment provisions in two prohibition cases which were decided the same day.59
The will in the Saunders case was worded: "and I direct that
my Executor and Trustee shall have power to invest and reinvest
in Government Bonds only or Bonds guaranteed by the Government."60 The trustees' investment in preferred stock, although a
legal investment, was held improper by the court. Justice Bell's
opinion stressed the importance of honoring the decedent's intent:
The testator's intention is the pole star in the construction of every will and that intention must be ascertained
from the language and scheme of his will; it is not what
the Court thinks he might or would or should have said
in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court
thinks he meant to say, but what is the meaning of his
words. 61
Obviously the language in the investment clause here indicated an
intention to limit the investment powers of the trustee.
This language is clear, unambiguous, unequivocal, imperative and mandatory, and without any doubt limited and
restricted her fiduciary's power of investment and reinvestment to Government bonds or bonds guaranteed by the
Government and thus prohibited
the fiduciary from any
62
other kind of investment.
The court further noted that it was unnecessary for a restriction to
be expressed in language identical to the statute.
The dominant judicial reaction to the Saunders decision was
an effort by orphans' courts to distinguish that case from the cases
before them for adjudication. The courts, placing special emphasis
on the specific language of the Saunders will, generally had little
difficulty in limiting the applicability of the supreme court's decision.
Thus, in Earle Estate63 the Philadelphia Orphans' Court faced
a will which provided that the trustees "are authorized and empowered" to make specified investments and "may also invest" in
certain other specified securities.6 4 Although this was the first case
58. In 'e Estate of Saunders, 393 Pa. 527, 143 A.2d 367 (1958).
59. In re Estate of Jeffries, 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958); In re
Estate of Kelsey, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).
60. In re Estate of Saunders, 393 Pa. 527, 528, 143 A.2d 167, 168

(1958).
61.
62.
63.
64.
My

Id. at 529-30, 143 A.2d at 168.
Id.
16 Pa. D. & C.2d 643 (O.C. Phila. 1959).
Id. at 645. The will provided:
Executors and Trustees are authorized and empowered to in-

of this kind since Saunders, Judge Bolger followed the past decisions of the Philadelphia Orphans' Court in enumeration cases.
He noted the decisions in Saunders and its companion prohibition
cases of Kelsey"5 and Jeffries,6 but held that the testamentary
language before him did not indicate an intent to exclude nonstipulated investments. 67 A few months later the Orphans' Court
of Montgomery County cited Earle Estate in ruling that a will
which granted a trustee the "power" to make certain investments
was not an express restriction on other "legals."' 8
Several courts, in finding that the Saunders holding did not
apply to cases before them, relied on the imperative character of
the testatrix's language in the former case, particularly her use of
the word "only." 9 In Foulke Estate70 the testator left his estate
"'In Trust,' that said Company will hold and invest the same, in
good Real Estate security. .. ." The court stressed the importance
of the words "only" and "direct" in the Saunders will, which were
not present in the instant case. Here the language of the trust
instrument could not be considered an express restriction on nonspecified legal investments, since "By it the testator suggests; he
does not direct investment in real estate security alone."71
Betts Trust,7 2 decided a few days after Foulke Estate by the
same court, found that earlier case to be "squarely in point." The
will which directed that the trustee "shall put and place [the corpus of the trust] in mortgages and ground rents. . ." was held not
to restrict the purchase of any other "legals," while the Saunders
decision was easily distinguished.
Again in Middleton Estate (No. 3), 73 the Bucks County Orphans' Court saw the use of "only" in the Saunders will as the key
to that decision. The opinion stated that the court was not "convinced" the supreme court would have made the same ruling absent the word "only," and in the instant case "No such exclusionary
vest and keep invested the Trust Funds of my estate in well
secured ground rents of first mortgages upon improved real estate
in the City of Philadelphia. They may also invest in bonds or in
Certificates of Loan of the United States, or of the States of Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and
Connecticut or of the cities of Philadelphia, Boston, or New ork.
65. 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).
66. 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958).
67. Earle Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 643, 646-47 (O.C. Phila. 1959).
68. Henderson Estate, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 411, 413 (O.C. Montg. 1959).
The investment clause confers:
power, during the activity of the trust, to exercise any or all the
powers following: (1) to make investments and reinvestments in

first class mortgages, railroad bonds or any other corporation

bonds secured by first mortgage, whether of a public or private
character; United States, State or Municipal Bonds, provided that
no single investment exceeds the sum of Twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000).
69. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
70. 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 773 (O.C. Phila. 1959).

71. Id. at 774-75.
72. 9 Fiduc. Rep. 647 (O.C. Phila. 1959).
73. 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 18 (O.C. Bucks 1959).
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word or phrase appears .... "4 In a similar vein, the court in
Henderson Estate75 suggested that a testator wishing to limit a
trustee to the investments he specified could do so easily enough
by just adding "only" to the listed investments.
The Middleton (No. 3) court conceded that the Saunders case
might seem closely analogous at first glance, but noted that
lower courts since then had "uniformly held" that the language of
several settlors in enumeration cases did not amount to express
restrictions on legal investments. Two of these cases, Earle Estate76 and Henderson Estate,77 could not be applied here since they
contained "bare permissive enumerations" of certain investments.
But the court agreed with the interpretations of investment enumerations in the Foulke and Betts cases, which distinguished mere
enumerations from the more forceful language of the Saunders
will. In the Saunders decision, the supreme court had simply
given effect to a mandatory expression of intention by the settlor.
But short of such language, an instrument's provisions should not
be construed to prohibit legal investments:
We ... now reiterate, that the legislature, in its phrasing

of Section 18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949, in
fact intended as a matter of policy to permit general
availability of "legals" notwithstanding possible inferences
to the contrary in the trust instrument
unless the settlor
s
expressly provided otherwise3
In 1960, the Orphans' Courts of Montgomery and Erie Counties
both decided enumeration cases on the basis of other orphans'
courts' decisions rather than the Saunders decision. The instrument in Knox Trust,79 which specified "certain rather broadly
enumerated types of securities ...",o was held to lack the "clear,
unambiguous and mandatory" language of the Saunders will, and
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 23.
19 Pa. D.
16 Pa. D.
19 Pa. D.
Middleton

& C.2d
& C.2d
& C.2d
Estate

411, 417 (O.C. Montg. 1959).
643 (O.C. Phila. 1959).
411 (O.C. Montg. 1959).
(No. 3), 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 18, 24 (O.C. Bucks

1959).

79. 10 Fiduc. Rep. 409 (O.C.Montg. 1960).
80. Id. at 410. The investment clause reads:
NINTH:

. . . I give ... to my trustees ... for the following uses

and purposes:
(a) In respect to my personal estate existing at the time of my
death, either to retain the investments as they then exist, or the
same in their discretion to sell and convert into money and the
proceeds thereof to invest and reinvest in good first mortgages on
real estate or in the bonds of corporations, not being confined to
the first mortgage bonds thereof but having a broad discretion to
invest in corporate securities in the, nature of bonds, debtentures
and trust certificates, and not being confined to what are known
as "legal investments" in Pennsylvania.

therefore did not prohibit other legals. In Walker Trust,8 ' Judge
(now Justice) Roberts of the Erie County Orphans' Court held
that the investment provision, that the trust fund should remain
invested and the proceeds reinvested in mortgages on certain types
of real estate, simply showed a preference by the testator for certain investments, rather than a prohibition on other "legals"; testator had refrained from use of mandatory language such as in the
82
Saunders case.
With the 1961 decision by the Delaware County Orphans'
Court in Brown Trusts ' that an enumeration of investments did
not preclude other "legals, ' '8 4 it seemed clear that the supreme
court's holding in Saunders had had little effect on Pennsylvania
case law. In fact, the string of orphans' court decisions since
1949 favoring broad, non-restrictive interpretations of investment
provisions remained otherwise unbroken.
In 1962 the supreme court, speaking again through Chief Justice Bell, dropped the other shoe. On review of Brown Trust s . the
court reversed the lower court's decision. The instruction in the
instrument to invest "as hereinafter provided," followed by an
enumeration of several investments,86 was held to impose an express restriction on other legal investments. The major thrust of
the court's opinion, as in the Saunders case, was that the intentions of a testator must be strictly honored in the disposition of
his estate.
Today life tenants are like political divisions of Government-they want and need more money. There are not
many in the legislature or the Courts to champion or protect the interests of unknown remaindermen and even
fewer who still believe that a man who works hard all his
adult life has a right to will and condition or limit his
own estate as he desires. The temptation for all of us is to
be human and favor the known over the unknown and the
dead, even if we have to change a testator's will or intent
(for the worthy objective of benefiting the primary ob81. 10 Fiduc. Rep. 471 (O.C.Erie 1960).
82. Id. at 472-74. The investment clause provides:
Said trust fund shall remain invested in the said first lien mortgages . . . the proceeds . . . shall be reinvested . . . in judgment

bonds secured by first lien mortgages upon modern or semi-

modern residences, . . . and located in good and desirable residenor upon commercial real estate located in a comtial sections ...

mercial district ....
83. 11 Fiduc. Rep. 508 (O.C. Del. 1961), rev'd. sub. nom. In re Estate
of Brown, 408 Pa. 214, 183 A.2d 307 (1962).
84. Id. at 512. The court said that the Saunders will contained such
"positive and affirmative language of an unequivocal nature" that it
"amounted to an express restriction or prohibition," but distinguished such
language from that in the instant case:
It would be fallacious to conclude that any such mere negative
inference constitutes restrictive or prohibitory language of a mandatory nature which would preclude legal investments authorized
by statute.
85. In re Estate of Brown, 408 Pa. 214, 183 A.2d 307 (1962).
86. Id. at 216; 183 A.2d at 309. See note 35 supra for language of the

investment clause.
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jects of testator's bounty) in order to do so. But this is
87
not the law.
It was held that the language of the will clearly showed an intention to limit investments. Within the meaning of the Act of 1949,
it was therefore an express restriction.
The three enumeration cases decided since the supreme court's
decision in Brown have not reached consistent results.8 8 In Henry
Trust, 9 the Delaware County Orphans' Court gave a non-restrictive construction to an investment clause which described in great
detail the securities in which the trustee "may invest." 90 The
court noted the "decidedly restrictive" position the supreme court
had followed, but found "certain distinguishable differences" between the Brown will and the instant will. The testator here
twice stated his intention not to limit his trustee to "legals," the
language of the instant will was permissive due to phrases such
as "may invest," the trustee here was permitted to invest further
in any securities he might retain, and the list of enumerated investments here was much longer than in the Brown will. Therefore, on a reading of the will as a whole, the court did not find an
intention by the settlor to prohibit his trustee from making nonspecified legal investments.9 1
This decision was affirmed on appeal to the supreme court.92
In re Estate of Henry marked the first time that the supreme
court had ruled that an enumeration of investments in an instrument did not constitute an express restriction on other legal investments; however, Chief Justice Bell carefully limited the effect
of the holding to the case before him. His opinion emphasized
that the language of the Henry will "was importantly different"
from that in Saunders or Brown. The will as a whole revealed no
intention to limit the trustee's investment powers even to "legals,"
so the court did not find an express restriction on "legals" in the
language. But the court did reiterate the "basic and applicable"
legal principles for the determination of this kind of case, as had
been announced in Saunders and Brown; the intent of the testator
must guide the construction of every will and a settlor has the
87. Id. at 222, 183 A.2d at 314.
88. Close Estate, 40 Pa. D. & C.2d 128 (O.C. Montg. 1965); Knox
Trust (No. 2), 14 Fiduc. Rep. 599 (O.C. Montg. 1964); Henry Trust, 13
Fiduc. Rep. 515 (O.C. Del. 1963), afj'd. sub. nom. In re Estate of Henry,
413 Pa. 478, 198 A.2d 585 (1964).
89. 13 Fiduc. Rep. 515 (O.C. Del. 1963), aff'd. sub. nom. In re Estate
of Henry, 413 Pa. 478, 198 A.2d 585 (1964).
90. Id. at 516.
91. Id. at 521-23.
92. In re Estate of Henry, 413 Pa. 478, 198 A.2d 585 (1964).

right to dispose of his property in a will secure from judicial rewriting. 93
Later in 1964 the will in Knox Trust (No. 2)1 4 presented
the Montgomery County Orphans' Court with the question whether
Brown or Henry controlled. In following the latter, the court
noted that as in Henry the instrument expressed an intent to
authorize investment in "legals," whereas in the Brown case such
95
authority was lacking. In the 1965 case of Close Estate (No. 2),
the Philadelphia Orphans' Court reached an opposite conclusion
based on Brown. Facing an instrument which provided that the
trustee "shall invest and re-invest" in certain enumerated investments, 96 the court held that the enumeration clause precluded
other investments. Although the language of the instrument was
almost identical to that in several orphans' court cases which had
been found to fall short of express restrictions on "legals,"9 nevertheless the court decided that the case was similar to the situation
presented by the Brown will and was controlled by that decision.
The contrasting results of Knox Trust (No. 2) in 1964 and
Close Estate (No. 2) in 1965 mark the last two decisions of enumeration cases in Pennsylvania. Since the law in these situations
hardly seems clear, due to the conflict in attitude of the supreme
court and most orphans' courts, this lack of recent cases is difficult to understand. Perhaps one explanation is that trustees of
pre-1949 trusts, who presently enjoy broad investment powers because of non-restrictive interpretations made of their instruments
in the early or mid-1950's are now reluctant to submit these instruments for readjudication. On the other hand, instruments for
trusts created since 1949 may have been drawn with the Act of
1949 clearly in mind, so that no judicial interpretation is needed.
At any rate, a summation of the current law for enumeration
cases would have to admit the situation remains unclear. Certainly, if the enumeration of investments is entirely in permissive
language, then it will be held not to restrict other legal investments; even the supreme court took this view in the Henry decision. But the case is different when the enumeration is phrased
in quite definite or mandatory language. Although the supreme
court has not spoken for a decade, and its composition has changed
since then, the law still stands as established by the Saunders and
Brown decisions, that an enumeration in mandatory terms is equivalent to an express restriction on all other legal investments.
The hypothetical which was introduced earlier presented an
93. Id. at 483-88, 198 A.2d at 587-90.
94. 14 Fiduc. Rep. 599 (O.C. Montg. 1964). See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
95. 40 Pa. D. C.2d 128 (O.C. Montg. 1965).
96. See note 31 and accompanying text supra for the exact wording
of the investment clause and a discussion of an earlier adjudication in this

trust.
97. See notes 37, 70 and 82 and accompanying text supra.
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enumeration clause in the first part of its instrument's investment
provisions. Its language, quite typical of enumeration cases, can
be seen to be no more than permissive. Certainly the stipulation
that the "trustee may invest at his direction" in certain securities
could not be seen as an express restriction on other "legals" within
the meaning of section 18 of the Act of 1949. The injunction
against investment in stocks, in the second part of the instrument,
is another matter however. It presents the problems found in prohibition cases, the second category of interpretation cases.
B.

ProhibitionCases

A case may be considered a prohibition case if the trust instrument specifically says that certain investments are not to be made.
As with enumeration cases, the language in prohibition cases varies
from instrument to instrument. The development of Pennsylvania
law in prohibition cases parallels that in enumeration cases, with
broad non-restrictive interpretations by orphans' courts relying
on the Act of 1949 followed by restrictive decisions by the supreme
court in the late 1950's. Since both enumeration and prohibition
cases involve the interpretation of investment terms, it is not unusual to find an enumeration case cited as authority in the decision
of a prohibition case.98
Most investment clauses in prohibition cases, though varying
in their language, follow the same pattern; there is first a broad
grant of investment authority, often including the right to purchase "non-legals," and then some restriction on this authority,
usually in the form of a prohibition on a certain type of investment.
Woolston Trust,9 9 the first prohibition case to arise under the
Act of 1949, was typical of this pattern.
The Woolston will permitted the trustees "To invest and reinvest ... at discretion, not being confined to what are known as
'legal investments' . . . ." A codicil confirmed this, "but provided
that they make no new investments in shares of corporations."'' 0 0
98. See, e.g., Tower Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 447 (O.C. Phila. 1954).
99. 4 Fiduc. Rep. 141 (O.C. Phila. 1953).
100. Id. at 142-43. The clause reads:
With power in my said Executors and Trustees, in addition to
and not in limitation of any authority given them by law, to exercise any of the following powers, viz:

.

.

. 2. To invest and rein-

vest, alter, vary, and change investments, and reinvestments from
time to time, not being confined to what are known as "Legal Investments," any Statute to the contrary notwithstanding.
A codicil further provided:
In my will I have provided that my Trustees invest and reinvest
at discretion, not being confined to what are known as "legal investments." This, I confirm, but provide that they make no new
investments in shares of corporations.

Judge Shoyer, in holding that preferred stock was a proper investment, formulated a scheme of interpretation that was to be applied
repeatedly in similar prohibition cases. He ruled that since the
first part of the investment provision was a broad conferral of
power to make even non-legal investments, the limiting language
after this (in the instant case, the language of the codicil) should
be construed as applying only to "non-legals." The result was that
the trustees' power to invest in stocks remained intact, so long as
the stocks qualified as "legals." Here the codicil could not restrict
the trustee beyond legal investments, since it, as well as the rest
of the investment provision, was subject to the statement in the
introductory paragraph that the specified powers were "inaddition
to and not in limitation of" legal authority. 10 1
Two cases the following year adopted this formula that prohibitory language which followed a grant of authority for nonlegal investments would restrict only the non-legals. In Tower
Estate10 2 the testator specifically freed his trustees from confinement to legal investments and further granted "full power to select any investments or securities they may approve except the
Capital Stocks of Corporations and obligations not accompanied
with reasonable securities .... ,,103 The court reviewed the Woolston decision, as well as several enumeration cases, 0 4 and concluded that the language in the instant case was not a prohibition
on legal stock investment:
It is clear then under the Act of 1949 there must be an
"express restriction" imposed by a testator upon the investment by a trustee in any particular type of security
listed in the Act if the trustee is to be denied the power
given by the Legislature to make such investment. 0 5
In Shannon Trust 08 Judge Shoyer gave a broad interpretation to a will which provided that the trustees
invest and reinvest the said portion of my residuary estate in good interest bearing securities, other than stock of
corporations, with power to alter and change such investments from time to time whenever my said Trustees may
deem the same prudent, without requiring my said trust101. Id. at 145-47.
102. 87 Pa. D. & C.447 (O.C. Phila. 1954).
103. Id. at 448. The full investment provision reads:
and to invest and keep invested the same and every part of the
capital thereof so as to make the same as productive as reasonably
can be . . . and making such new investments as they in their
judgment and discretion shall deem advisable and advantageous to

my Estate without confining themselves to such investments as the
law directs for the investment of trust funds, hereby allowing
them full power to select any investments or securities they may
approve except the Capital Stocks of Corporations and obligations

not accompanied with reasonable securities.

104. Id. at 451-53. See notes 20, 26, 30, 39 and 43 and accompanying
text supra for a fuller discussion of Rouse Estate, Smith Trust, Close
Estate, FrazierTrust and Wayne Trust.
105. Tower Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C.2d 447, 453 (O.C. Phila. 1954).
106. 4 Fiduc. Rep. 554 (O.C. Phila. 1954).
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ees to invest said fund in what are termed "legal securities". . .107
Finding that the investment clause lacked "internal clarity," the
court held that the Tower Trust theory that a prohibition on investment powers authorizing "non-legals" limits only the non-legal
investments, was applicable here, in permitting all legal investments.108
The 1955 prohibition cases of Dunn Estate'0 9 and White Estate"10 both involved wills which granted broad investment powers, including that of purchasing "non-legals," and followed this
grant with a prohibition on stock purchases. The Philadelphia
Orphans' Court held in both cases that the restrictions on stock
applied only to "non-legals." l l
By 1958 the situation regarding prohibition cases seemed clear,
since the orphans' courts had shown the same unanimity as in
enumeration cases. But two Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions, 112 announced the same day as Saunders, threw the previous
lower court decisions into considerable doubt.
One decision, In re Estate of Keisey,'1 5 might not in itself have
had a strong effect on previously decided prohibition cases since
the language of the will was fairly explicit in prohibiting certain
investments. 114 With no difficulty the supreme court held that
the language was clearly an express restriction." 15
16
In re Estate of Jeffries,"
however, presented a situation
which paralleled that in many of the past orphans' courts' decisions. The Jeffries' will provided:
107. Id. at 555.
108. Id. at 557-58.
109. 5 Fiduc. Rep. 169 (O.C. Phila. 1955). The will directs the trustees:
to keep the same invested upon security satisfactory to them,
such as well secured railroad bonds, without restrictions to legal
investments, but not stock other than such stocks as may be
among my assets at my death.
110. 5 Fiduc. Rep. 503 (O.C. Phila. 1955). The will directs that the
trustee is not limited to
legal investments . . . it being my intention that the trustees shall
exercise their best discretion with no other restriction saving that
they shall not purchase shares of corporation stock except to protect shares of stock by me owned at the time of my decease.
111. White Estates, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 503 (O.C. Phila. 1955); Dunn Estate,
5 Fiduc. Rep. 169 (O.C. Phila. 1955).
112. In re Estate of Jeffries, 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958); In re
Estate of Kelsey, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).
113. 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).
114. Id. at 515-16, 143 A.2d at 43-44. The will states:
the power of investment of said Trustee shall not in any event
include the right to invest in stocks.
115. Id. at 516-19, 143 A.2d at 44-45.
116. 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958).

Seventh: I confer power upon my Trustees during the activity of the trust:-. . . To retain any investments which
I may have made, and to alter, vary and change investments and reinvestments from time to time, without being confined to what are known as legal securities; but
they shall have no power to purchase shares of stock. 17
This was the common situation of a broad grant of investment
powers, even including "non-legals," followed by a prohibition on
some investment. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Bell chose not to
follow the reasoning of the lower court decisions, emphasizing instead that the language was quite definite in showing the settlor's
intent and therefore qualified as an express restriction on
stocks."" The Kelsey and Jeffries decisions, along with the Brown
decision of 1962, clearly showed that the supreme court had
adopted a restrictive attitude toward section 18 of the 1949 Act.
The next prohibition case to appear, however, did not follow
the supreme court's position. In Clyde Estate," 9 there was the
usual broad grant of non-legal as well as legal investment powers,
followed by the phrase "though I do not wish investments to be
made in shares of stock. .... ',12o Although this grant seemed similar to that in Jeffries, the Philadelphia Orphans' Court held that
the purported prohibition here was only in precatory language,
and therefore should not be construed as an express restriction on
stock. A similar type of, investment provision was interpreted in
Tower Estate (No. 2)121 a year later. Again the Philadelphia Orphans' Court found that the language was permissive rather than
mandatory, 22 noting that the language of the four supreme court
cases was distinguishable from the instant case.
It is evident that in prohibition cases the orphans' courts have
made considerable effort toward broad interpretations, relying upon the 1949 Act. But here, just as with enumeration cases, the attitude of the supreme court has been much more restrictive. The
Clyde and Tower cases, the only two to have been reported since
the supreme court decisions, have tried to distinguish these cases
rather than follow them. But the attitude of the supreme court
and its silence since Brown tend to cast doubt over the state of
the law in prohibition cases.
The language of the hypothetical case in its prohibitory section
leaves little room for doubt, however. The phrase "under no circumstances, however, shall he invest in stock of any corporation," is
23
certainly as clear as the language which supreme court decisions1
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 524, 143 A.2d at 392.
Id. at 525-27, 143 A.2d at 392-93.
30 Pa. D. & C,2d 219 (O.C. Phila. 1963).
Id. at 221.
34 Pa. D. & C.2d 321 (O.C. Phila. 1964).
See note 102 and accompanying text supra for the investment

provisions of this instrument and discussion of an earlier adjudication in
this trust.
123. In re Estate of Jeffries, 393 Pa. 523, 143 A.2d 391 (1958); In re
Estate of Kelsey, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).
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have held to satisfy the statutory requirement of an express restriction.
C.

Important Factors in the Decisions

In many of the interpretation cases, whether of the enumeration or prohibition variety, certain common factors appear and influence the result. Examples of some of the more important of
these factors should be examined.
Certainly the language of the instrument being interpreted is
the key consideration in any "interpretation case." But since ambiguity is presumably the reason there is a need for judicial interpretation, the language, in and of itself is generally not enough to
determine with certainty how the decision will fall.
Looking only at the bare grants of investment power, it is
possible-but only in some cases-to determine from the simple
wording of the conferral of investment authority what the decision
in the case will be. For example, there should be no question
that testators who "empower" or "authorize and empower" their
trustees to make certain investments are not expressly restricting
the trustees to the investments mentioned. 24 Words such as "authorize" or "empower" clearly indicate mere permission to do the
specified act. Likewise, an instrument which provides that a trustee "may invest" in certain ways is no more than permissive in
language, and does not amount to an express restriction on other
legals. 125 "May also invest" and "shall have
the right to invest"
126
have also been held to be merely permissive.
Contrariwise, certain language, mandatory in its effect, may
act as an express restriction within the meaning of the 1949 Act.
In the Saunders will12 7 the settlor's combined use of "direct,"
"shall," and "only" in specifying investments was sufficiently imperative to exclude all other investments. The provision that the
trustee "shall not in any event" make a certain investment was
sufficient in itself to impose an effective prohibition in In re Estate
128
of Kelsey.
124.

Rouse Estate, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 514 (O.C. Phila. 1951); Wayne Trust,

4 Fiduc. Rep. 100 (O.C. Phila. 1954); see Wayne Trust at 102-03 for a
discussion of RESTATEMENT OF TausTs § 227, comment (t) (1935): If a
trustee is authorized he has a privilege but not a duty to make the investment; if he is directed he has a duty not merely a privilege to invest.
125.

See, e.g., Henry Trust, 13 Fiduc. Rep. 515 (O.C. Del. 1963), afld

sub. nor. In re Estate of Henry, 413 Pa. 478, 198 A.2d 585 (1964).
126. Earle Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 643 (O.C. Phila. 1959).
127. In re Estate of Saunders, 393 Pa. 527, 143 A.2d 367 (1958). See
text accompanying note 60 supra for the language of the investment clause.
128. 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).

Unfortunately most language granting investment powers is
not so clearly identifiable as either mandatory or permissive. For
example, a common term such as "shall invest" has been given totally opposite interpretations. 12 9 One court noted that the use of
"will," in the provision that a trustee "will hold and direct," could
be considered an order but could equally well be considered just
the use of the future tense.' 30 Even a word such as "direct," which
clearly seems more mandatory than most expressions, has been
held to be both mandatory' 3 ' and permissive." 2
Faced with such a dilemma, courts have carried their examination of a testator's language one step further. Instead of just
examining the language of the investment terms, they often examine the language of the entire instrument. This may give clues
as to the settlor's intentions as to the amount of discretion he
wished his trustees to have. The orphans' courts have often followed this procedure in prohibition cases, in interpreting the prohibitory language as applicable only to the grant of power to invest
13
Courts frequently refer to the importance of
in "non-legals.""'
looking beyond a narrow investment clause to the will as a whole.
The Brown opinion stressed that a court must "consider the language and scheme of his entire will in the light of the attendant
-134 In several cases, both of the enumeration
circumstances ....
and prohibition types, the courts have noted that an examination
of the entire trust instrument or of parts of the instrument other
than the investment clause was helpful in determining whether the
investment language was permissive or mandatory." 5
Similar to this concern over language as a way of ascertaining
a testator's intent, courts have sometimes noted the composition of
the trust estate left by the testator as a way of determining his intentions regarding certain investments. For example, the court in
Tower Estate"36 noted in approving a purchase of stock that the
settlor's estate had been largely composed of stock. Again in
Shannon Trust"87 the same court permitted stock investment, observing that one-sixth of the estate was in common stock, which
presumably indicated that the testatrix had "no aversion" to such
investments.
129. See Close Estate (No. 2), 40 Pa. D. & C.2d 128 (O.C. Montg. 1965);
but see Close Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 136 (O.C. Montg. 1954).
130. Foulke Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 773, 775 (O.C. Phila. 1959).
131. See, e.g., Neafie Estate, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 291, 293 (O.C. Phila. 1955).
132. See, e.g., Middleton Estate (No. 2), 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 133, 143
(O.C. Bucks 1955).
133. See Woolston Trust, 4 Fiduc. Rep. 141 (O.C. Phila. 1953); Tower
Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 447 (O.C. Phila. 1954); Shannon Trust, 4 Fiduc. Rep.
554 (O.C. Phila. 1954); Dunn Estate, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 169 (O.C. Phila. 1955);
White Estate, 5 Fiduc. Rep. 503 (O.C. Phila. 1955).
134. In re Estate of Brown, 408 Pa. 214, 219, 183 A.2d 307, 312 (1962).
135. See Tower Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 321 (O.C. Phila. 1964); Earle
Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d Phila. 643 (O.C. 1959); Smith Trust, 2 Fiduc. Rep.
393 (O.C. Phila. 1952); Rouse Estate, 1 Fiduc. Rep. 514 (O.C. Phila. 1951).
136. 87 Pa. D. & C. 447, 450 (O.C. Phila. 1954).
137. 4 Fiduc. Rep. 554 (O.C. Phila. 1954).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

In a number of cases, changing economic factors and conditions have been cited by courts as matters affecting their decisions. These have of course been decisions in favor of non-restric38
tive interpretations of investment provisions. In Close Estate
the Philadelphia Orphans' Court concluded that this factor was
the reason for section 18 of the 1949 Act, stating that, "The purpose
of the Legislature was to protect trust estates in a changing world,
beyond the power of a testator or settlor to see or anticipate."
And in Brown Estate39 the court noted that it was "manifestly unwise to bind a trustee in an investment strait-jacket
fashioned by a settlor or testator who could not possibly have
foreseen the economic exigencies of the present fast-moving
world.' 140 Also in Walker Trust, 14' where certain types of mortgage investments were specified, the court noted that there had
been many changes in local real estate which made it unlikely that
the specified mortgages would be available as investments.
Another factor which might influence a court's interpretation
of fiduciary investment language was raised in Walker Trust.
This was the question of the business expertise of both the testator
and his trustee. The fact that both were experienced businessmen
influenced the court towards granting a non-restrictive interpreta142
tion of the investment provisions.
Some courts also consider the presence of beneficiaries and remaindermen, and their attitudes towards allowing greater investment powers. The court in Walker Trust, for example, noted that
the life tenant and remaindermen in that trust all favored allowing the trustee to make any legal investments. 143 In Woolston
4
Trust,1
" the court stressed that only the remainderman favored
the court's holding. This concern for the remaindermen was also
shown in Shannon Trust,145 where the court noted that recent investment history showed that investment in stocks usually improved the position of remaindermen.
Another factor, closely aligned to the preceding one, was
strongly emphasized by the Philadelphia Orphans' Court in Tower
Estate (No. 2).14 In that case, not only did all 41 beneficiaries
join in requesting a broad interpretation of the investment powers,
138.
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140.
141.
142.
143.
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145.
146.

83 Pa. D. & C. 136, 147 (O.C. Phila. 1952).
85 Pa. D. & C. 452 (O.C. Del. 1953).
Id. at 459.
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but also the trustees had made a substantial number of non-specified investments over the last ten years in reliance on an earlier
adjudication.1 47 The court refused to limit its previous interpretation, emphasizing the trustees' reliance on the prior decision and
the hardship that narrowing the investment field would cause the
14
beneficiaries.
III.

MODIFICATION CASES

It will be recalled that in the hypothetical case the enumeration of investments in the first part of the instrument was determined not to be an express restriction on other "legals," including,
of course, stock. But the language following the enumeration did
clearly express an effective prohibition on the purchase of stock.
Even if the trustee felt that stock was a highly desirable or necessary purchase, judicial interpretation of the instrument would not
permit this. However, the trustee might still have an alternative
remedy which would enable him to invest in stocks. This would
be to request a court to approve deviation from the terms of the
investment clause. By doing this, the trustee would move the
case into the second major category of cases considered by this
Comment. These are modification cases, where the trustee in effect modifies the terms of the instrument by deviating from them.
In 1967, Pennsylvania courts were given much greater authority to approve deviation from the terms of instruments, by an
amendment to the 1949 Act. Under this amendment, a court may
permit modification of an instrument when it is necessary in order
to carry out the dominant purpose of a trust, 1which
would other49
wise be impossible or impractical of fulfillment.
The amendment is not a sharp departure from past law, since
the Restatement of Trusts, 2d, permits the same kind of court action under similar circumstances.' 50 However, Pennsylvania courts
were slow to implement this position:
Prior to enactment of the foregoing legislation, our Pennsylvania courts were extremely reluctant to invoke the
principle with respect to investment provisions of a trust,
and did so only in the case of charitable trusts.' 5 '
The 1954 decision in Middleton Estate'52 is illustrative of this prevailing judicial attitude. Evidence showed that a non-charitable
trust's income had declined due to rigid investment restrictions, resulting in the impairment of the purpose of the trust. The court
noted that the Restatement position was a proper statement of
Pennsylvania law. The court declined to permit deviation, how147.
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149.
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ever, because all other Pennsylvania cases which had considered
this possibility regarding investment provisions had refused to approve deviation. The only exceptions the court found were in
charitable trusts.
However, the 1960's did present, even prior to the 1967 amendment, several cases in which deviation was permitted in non-charitable trusts. In Kittredge Estate,'5" a will established a private
trust in which the trustee was expressly prohibited from selling
certain stocks. The court approved the sale of these stocks, relying
on its power to authorize deviation in order to prevent impairment
of the trust purpose, since the evidence showed that serious harm
to the trust could result from failure to sell. In 1966 in Green
Trust, 54 the Philadelphia Orphans' Court relied on section 167 of
the Restatement of Trusts, 2d, 155 for its decision to allow deviation.
It found that strict adherence to the investment provisions of the
settlor would endanger the purpose of the trust, by requiring
purchase of investments at unreasonably high prices or by causing
much of the trust corpus to remain uninvested. 15
In a 1967 case, 1 57 the Crawford County Orphans' Court ap-

proved a vote by trustees of stock for merger with another company, although the trust instrument specifically forbade this. In a
sense Wright Trust went beyond even the Restatement view, since
the court did not find any present danger of failure of the trust's
purpose. But the court held that a decision based solely on the
current situation would be shortsighted, since future pressures for
merger would inevitably arise and prove harmful:
In short, and in summary, what we are here holding is
that, although compliance with the terms of the trust
would not now defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, deviation is necessary to prevent the future defeat or substantial impairment of the primary purpose of the trust and to carry out
the other purposes insofar as is possible under the circumstances.15 8
This judicial trend towards permitting deviation in non-charitable trusts seems to have been accelerated by the statutory approval afforded by the 1967 amendment. Since then, decisions
have permitted investment deviation in both charitable and private trusts. Just a month after adoption of the 1967 amendment,
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the Philadelphia Orphans' Court permitted deviation in DeKrafft
Estate,15 9 although it did not mention the new legislation.
More recently the Adams County Orphans' Court, in Stewart
Memorial Fund,160 relied on the 1967 amendment in permitting a
trustee to disregard an investment provision and invest in any "legals." A requirement that all investments yield at least five per
cent income was held to make the trust's purpose "impractical of
fulfillment." In re Trust of Mintz'6 1 took the same position. Here
the supreme court approved an action by the trustees which was a
deviation from the investment provisions. The court found justification in the fact that the company involved was in "desperate
straits" at the time, so that adherence to the investment provision
might have resulted in failure of the trust purpose.
Obviously, the language of the instrument is not the key factor
in modification cases. The situation presented is normally one in
which the instrument clearly directs or forbids certain investments; what is sought is court approval of outright deviation from
these instructions. Factors outside of the language of the trust
instrument are therefore crucial in deciding if such deviation
should be permitted. The primary concern is whether the major
purpose of the trust would be seriously impaired by following the
settlor's investment provisions. If this fact can be established,
then the court can apply the provisions of both the Restatement
and the Amendment of 1967 to permit deviation. In all of the
modification cases discussed above, this question was a determining factor.
A factor of major importance in the modification cases, just as
in the interpretation cases, is that of changing economic conditions.
These may threaten failure of the trust's purpose in cases where
1 2
the settlor was unable to foresee such changes. In Wright Trust, 6
for example, the court noted that conditions in the business in
which the trust was involved had changed since the settlor's death.
It said that in approving deviation from the instructions of the
settlor it was only doing what he would have done could he have
16 3
foreseen the changed circumstances. The court in Green Trust
likewise commented that the testator could not have known that
the investments he specified had become difficult to find and could
not be obtained at reasonable prices.
The importance of changing economic conditions may be seen
in both interpretation and modification cases. Another common
factor of importance in both is the effect on the beneficiaries and
remaindermen of the decision to broaden investment powers. For
example, in Wright Trust" the court emphasized the unfortunate
159.
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effect on the beneficiaries of following the investment provisions.
Whether the trust is private or charitable is another important
consideration in modification cases; courts seem much more willing
to grant deviation in the latter cases. 165 The 1967 amendment to
the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 does not distinguish between the two types of trusts. But perhaps it is significant that in
two of the recent cases which permitted deviation, Stewart Memorial Fund'6 6 and DeKrafft Estate,16 the trusts were charitable.
One explanation of the greater deviation permitted charitable
trusts might perhaps be that their dominant purpose is always
easy to ascertain and there usually are not competing interests of
beneficiaries and remaindermen.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Efforts by Pennsylvania trustees to take advantage of broad
statutory investment powers despite narrower language in their
trust instruments have resulted in two types of cases seeking deviation from the settlor's instructions. In interpretation cases, what
amounts to effective deviation is sought through a broader interpretation of an instrument's investment language; in modification
cases actual deviation from or modification of the investment provision is sought. Section 18 of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of
1949,16s providing that the instrument must expressly restrict a legal investment in order to preclude it, and an amendment to this
section in 1967,169 permitting deviation in order to prevent failure
or impairment of a trust's purpose, have respectively had profound
influence on the two types of cases.
Relying on section 18, orphans' courts in interpretation cases
were unanimous in construing instruments to permit any legal investments barring an express restriction on some security. They
uniformly ruled through the 1960's that enumerations of investments to be made or purported prohibitions on investments were
not effective in cutting off the right to invest in any "legal" permitted by statute. However, the state supreme court in three
1958 cases and one 1962 case took a restrictive position and refused
to permit all legal investments in their construction of instruments. Many attempts have been made to distinguish these cases
165. See, e.g., Stewart Memorial Fund, 13 Adams L.J. 121, 127 (Pa.
C.P. 1971); Middleton Estate, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 162 (O.C. Bucks 1954).
166. 13 Adams L.J. 121 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
167. 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 760 (O.C. Phila. 1967).
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7319(a) (1972). See note 12 supra for
the statutory language.
169. PA. STAT. AaN. tit. 20, § 7319(b) (1972). See note 13 and accompanying text supra for the statutory language.

from subsequent lower court cases. The decisions, however, have
not been consistent in the few cases since 1962. The supreme
court decisions and its virtual silence since then leave the law applicable to interpretation cases in doubt. In these cases, the language of the. instrument is the critical factor, but there are other
influential and diverse factors.
In modification cases, the recent judicial trend has been to
permit deviation more frequently. The amendment of 1967 has
given impetus to this trend. In these cases the key question is
whether deviation is necessary to prevent failure of the trust's
purpose, but several other factors may be influential.
It is submitted that in both types of deviation situations courts
should show willingness to permit a trustee to deviate from investment provisions, either by making non-restrictive interpretations or by permitting actual deviation so long as this will not do
violence to the settlor's intent. In the modification cases, courts
seem to be satisfactorily implementing the 1967 amendment with
emphasis on the effect of deviation on the trust's purpose. But in
the interpretation cases the law remains unclear.
Pennsylvania courts should consistently support the legislative policy of section 18. Courts taking the restrictive position
emphasize the importance of honoring a settlor's intent. But it is
just as violative of this intent to supply a restriction when it is not
clearly expressed as it is to ignore a clearly expressed restriction.
There are other compelling reasons of public policy for encouraging non-restrictive interpretations of investment powers. Many
institutional trustees having responsibility for many trusts practice "pooling" of the assets of small trusts. Indeed, without this
practice many such trustees would be unwilling or unable to administer many small trusts, but restrictive interpretation of investment provisions in many small trusts makes it impossible to administer them in this way. Perhaps the major consideration is
that with the rapid economic changes of our society, the areas
where investment funds are needed are constantly changing.
Overly restrictive interpretations of investment instructions, when
not clearly mandated by the settlor's language, needlessly deny
investment funds to these areas of economic need and opportunity.
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